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ABSTRACT
Email is a pervasive means of communication on the Internet. Email ex-
changes between individuals can be seen as social interactions between email
sender(s) and receiver(s), thus can be represented as a network. Networks of
human interactions such as friendship relations, research collaborations, and
phone calls have been widely studied before to allow understanding of the char-
acteristics, as well as the structure and dynamics of such social interactions. In
this thesis, we look into the social network properties of email networks gen-
erated from real traffic, and investigate how a vast amount of unsolicited email
traffic (spam) affect these properties.
Current advances in Internet data collection and processing has facilitated
the study of the characteristics of email traffic observed on the Internet. In
our study, we have collected large-scale email datasets from traffic traversing a
high-speed Internet backbone link and have generated email networks from the
observed communications to analyze the structure and dynamics of these social
interactions. Moreover, we aim at unveiling the distinguishing characteristics
of legitimate and unsolicited email communications.
We show that the networks of legitimate email traffic has the same struc-
tural and temporal properties that other social networks exhibit, and therefore
can be modeled as small-world scale-free networks. However, the unsolicited
email communications cause deviations and anomalies in the structure of email
networks, and this deviation from the expected social structural properties can
be used to find the sources of spam email.
We also show that email networks, similar to other social networks, have
a community structure which can be found using different community detec-
tion algorithms. However, not all community detection algorithms can identify
structural communities that coincide with the true logical communities of email
networks, i.e., distinct communities of legitimate and unsolicited email. Our
study shows that a link-based community detection algorithm is more suitable
for this purpose than more widely used node-based algorithms.
The possibility of merely using the social structure of email traffic to iden-
tify the source of spam and separate the unsolicited email from legitimate email,
can potentially be used to improve the protection against spam and other types
of malicious activities on the Internet.
Keywords: Internet Backbone Traffic, Email Networks, Social Network Analysis, Spam,
Community Detection, Anomaly Detection
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Part I
INTRODUCTION

1
Introduction
Email is one of the most common services on the Internet with everyday busi-
ness and personal communications depending on it. Unfortunately, the vast
amount of unsolicited email (spam) consumes network and mail server re-
sources, imposes security threats, and costs businesses significant amounts of
money. Spam can also be exploited for phishing and scam and it can carry
Trojans, worms, or viruses, making email unreliable.
It is known that a large fraction of spam originates from botnets [29, 44]. A
botnet is a collection of compromised hosts (bots) where each bot contributes
to conducting malicious activities or attacks such as distributed denial of ser-
vice (DDoS), scanning, click frauds, and sending spam. Therefore, identifying
the source of spam can lead to the detection of the source of other malicious
activities on the Internet.
Numerous attempts to fight spam have led to implementation of anti-spam
tools that are quite successful in hiding the spam from users’ mailboxes. Most
3
of the conventional approaches inspect email contents at the receiving mail
servers, and are very resource-intensive. Although such content-based filters
are effective in learning what the content of spam looks like, the spammers are
very agile in obfuscating email contents and encapsulating their messages in
other formats such as images to bypass these filters.
As a complement to content-based filters, pre-filtering strategies are widely
used to stop spam before the email content is received and examined by the mail
servers. A commonly used pre-filtering method is IP blacklisting. The receiving
mail servers can consult IP blacklists to decide whether to accept or reject an
incoming email transaction. Early rejection of spam can dramatically decrease
the workload on mail servers and reduce the cost. However, IP addresses are
not persistent, they can be obtained from dynamic pools of addresses and they
can be stolen [12, 44]. In addition, bots usually send spam at a low rate to
each individual domain and do not reuse the IP addresses that have become
blacklisted.
In addition to the above mentioned anti-spam strategies, numerous other
spam detection and prevention techniques have been introduced. Approaches
such as enforcing laws and regulations, requesting proof-of-work (e.g., process-
ing time) [2], mail quota enforcement [54], port blocking, and user monitoring
are proposed to stop spam at the sender side. Greylisting [21], reputation-based
approaches, sender authentication, and domain verification are approaches that
can be used on the receiver side before accepting email contents. Replacing
SMTP with a new protocol or deploying overlay authentication protocols, are
some of the ideas proposed to stop spam during transit.
Despite the considerable advances in spam detection and prevention meth-
ods, there is a constant battle between spammers and anti-spam strategies. There-
fore, better understanding of the behavior of spam is crucial in order to find
methods that can stop spam as close to its source as possible. Recently, ap-
proaches that focus on the network-level behavior of spam have gained at-
tention. These approaches are concerned about email sending behavior of the
spammers, which is expected to be more difficult for them to change than for
instance the content of the email [8, 20, 45]. In order to improve and come
up with more such methods, there is a need to understand the network-level
characteristics of spam and how it differs from legitimate email (ham) traffic.
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The study of the characteristics of email and spam can be conducted us-
ing different types of email data. A number of studies have used SMTP log
files from mail servers [12, 18, 19, 51, 57]. Although such datasets are limited
to communications to/from a single domain, they contain detailed information
about each email and the statistical summaries of accepted and rejected email
communications, which allows the comparison of the behavior of spam, ham,
and the rejected traffic. The spam captured in honeypots or relay sinkholes have
also been used to study the characteristics of spam [43, 45]. The honeypots
only attract spammers, therefore they do not allow the comparison of different
characteristics and communication patterns of spam and ham. Flow-level data
collected on access routers have also been used to study the properties of spam
and rejected traffic [49]. These flows only contain packet headers, and although
they are not limited to a single domain, they do not carry enough information
to allow distinguishing spam from ham to study their distinct characteristics.
Another type of data that has been used to understand the sending behavior of
spam was collected from inside spam campaigns [23, 28, 29]. The data col-
lected at these campaigns has the view point of spammers and makes it possible
to closely investigate how spam is sent.
In our studies, we have used yet another type of email data. Our dataset
enables us to study the behavior of legitimate and unsolicited traffic from the
perspective of a network device which monitors the traffic traversing a back-
bone link. Recent advances in large-scale data collection and processing have
enabled us to collect SMTP traffic on high-speed Internet backbone links. The
collected email traffic is not limited to a single organization or domain and al-
lows us to classify the observed email into ham, spam, and rejected communi-
cations to compare their characteristics. The collection and processing of such
data, however, is not trivial. The challenges involved are both of general and
technical nature. Getting access to the link, handling the huge amount of traffic
on the link, privacy concerns, pre-processing and processing of the large-scale
dataset are just a number of challenges that need to be addressed before the
study of the characteristics of ham and spam traffic becomes possible.
After collecting the email dataset, the next step has been to look for the
network-level characteristics of spam that are distinct from ham. It is known
that spam is sent automatically, therefore it is expected that it does not exhibit
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the social network properties of human-generated communications [10, 18, 30,
51]. The social network properties of email communications can be studied
by analyzing the structure of email networks generated from email traffic. An
email network is an implicit social network in which each node represents an
email address and each edge represents an email. It has been shown that email
networks have the same structural properties that other social and interaction
networks have [13, 27, 33].
This thesis is concerned with the study of social structure of email networks
generated from real traffic which contain both legitimate and unsolicited email
communications. The goal is to find out how spam emails affect the structural
and temporal properties of email networks and propose methods to separate
them from a mixture of email traffic and spot the sources of spam based on
their antisocial behavior rather than on what they contain.
1.1 Social Network Properties
1.1.1 Network Structure
An extensive amount of work has aimed at understanding the structure and dy-
namics of network systems such as the Internet router structure [16], online so-
cial networks [37], the World Wide Web [11], phone call and SMS graphs [40],
and email networks [13]. Numerous studies have focused on characterizing,
modeling, and analyzing such networks to shed light on the behavior of the sys-
tem as a whole. Understanding the structure and dynamics of such networks
have also found many applications such as identifying Sybil identities in a net-
work [53, 59], spam detection [10, 18, 30, 51], stopping unwanted communi-
cations [38], traffic classification [22, 25], identifying botnets [39], understand-
ing the behavioral patterns of email usage [26], personalized email prioritiza-
tion [58], and anomaly and fraud detection [4, 35].
Traditionally, network data was studied as random graphs [14]. However,
empirical studies on different type of real network data have revealed interest-
ing properties such as the “small world phenomenon” [55], also known as “six
degrees of separation” [36], and the scale-free behavior of networks [7, 16].
These properties show that social and interaction networks are fundamentally
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different from other types of networks such as random networks [41]. A review
of the structural properties of these networks can be found in [5].
Many real networks have been modeled as small-world and scale-free net-
works. In a small-world network, the distance between any pair of nodes is
relatively short. The distance between two nodes is measured as the number of
edges on the shortest path connecting them. In addition to short average path
length, small-world networks tend to be highly clustered which can be quan-
tified using the average clustering coefficient [55]. Another robust measure of
the structure of networks is their degree distribution. The degree distribution
of a network characterizes the spread in the node degrees. It has been shown
that for social and interaction networks the degree distribution has a power law
tail [16]. Such networks are known as scale-free networks [7].
Numerous attempts to model the structure of social networks have also
taken other graph properties of these networks into account: the distribution
of the size of the connected components of the network, the presence of a gi-
ant connected component (GCC), and the community structure of the networks.
The study of the changes of different graph properties over time have also re-
vealed fascinating properties of network evolution such as shrinking diameter
and densification power law [32]. As social networks grow over time, they be-
come more connected, the size of their GCC increases, their diameter shrinks,
while their average clustering coefficient value stays constant.
The first study of the structure of email networks was performed by Ebel
et al. [13]. They studied an email network generated from log files of the mail
server of their university (Kiel University) and showed that this email network
is scale free and exhibits the properties of small-world networks. Studies on the
evolution of email networks have shown that email networks, similar to other
social networks, densify over time and their diameter shrink [33]. It was also
observed that the power law degree distribution shape and exponent of email
networks remain relatively constant over time [27, 33].
1.1.2 Community Structure
Another excessively studied structural property of social and interaction net-
works is their community structure. A community, also known as a cluster, is
7
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Figure 1.1: The communities in the Zachary karate club network found by applying the
fast modularity optimization algorithm by Blondel et al. [9] which coincides with the ac-
tual partitioning of the network into two groups (square and round nodes). A link-based
community detection algorithm can also reveal the true partitioning of the network (solid
and dashed edges), in which nodes with both type of edges are overlapping between the
two communities [15].
usually considered to be a set of nodes that are densely connected to each other
and have less connections to the rest of the network. This property has been
observed in many real networks, and particularly in social networks. A wide
variety of community detection algorithms, also known as clustering algorithms
have been proposed to extract the communities in a network merely based on
the structure of the network. Figure 1.1 shows an example of the communi-
ties identified by a community detection algorithm on a real network, Zachary’s
network of karate club members [60], which coincide with the true partitioning
of the network. A review of different type of community detection algorithms
can be found in [17, 48, 56].
Community detection has also found many applications such as finding
users with similar interests in a social network in order to provide recommenda-
tions to them, clustering users or clients that are geographically close or com-
municate a lot with each other in a system to improve the performance of the
service provided to them [24], and identifying the community of malicious users
in order to mitigate Sybil attacks [53]. In our study, we also show that a com-
munity detection algorithm can be used to separate unsolicited and legitimate
email into distinct communities.
Community detection algorithms typically aim at partitioning the nodes of
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a network into clusters so that a number of structural properties are satisfied.
Different community detection algorithms use different approaches and yield
different communities. In order to find out which algorithm yields the best
clustering, it is required to use a quantitative measure to assess the quality of
different clusterings. The most widely used structural quality function is modu-
larity [42] which is also widely used as an objective function to be optimized by
the community detection algorithms to create communities with high structural
quality. It has been shown that there is no single perfect quality function for the
comparison of the communities detected by different algorithms [6]. Therefore,
other well-known quality functions such as coverage, expansion, performance,
density, and conductance can also be investigated to allow the selection of the
most suitable algorithm for the network data at hand. In addition to the above
structural quality functions, the logical quality of the clustering can also be de-
termined based on how homogeneous the edges inside the communities are.
Recently, new community detection approaches have emerged that are based
on partitioning the edges of a network into communities rather than partition-
ing the nodes [3, 15]. Figure 1.1 shows that both node-based and edge-based
community detection algorithms identify the true partitioning of the network.
The solid lines and the dashed lines represent the two communities identified
by an edge-based community detection method. The nodes with both type of
edges are overlapping between these communities. Overlap can naturally exists
in many social and interaction networks [56].
The high diversity of community detection algorithms have made it neces-
sary to perform experimental evaluation of the algorithms on specific types of
networks to find the most suitable method for that type of network data. Email
communications can be either seen as flow of data or as pairwise relations be-
tween people, therefore both flow-based community detection approaches such
as markov clustering by Dongent [52] and maps of random walks by Rosvall et
al. [46, 47], and topological approaches such as fast modularity maximization
by Blondel at al. [9], and link community detection by Ahn et al. [3], can be
suitable for clustering email networks. Leskovec et al. [34] have empirically
compared different clustering algorithms on different real networks including
email networks of single organizations. Lancichinetti et al. [31] have also com-
pared different community detection algorithms and have shown that the struc-
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ture of the communities in an email network of an organization is similar to the
structure of communities in other communication networks.
1.2 Our Approach
Previous studies on the structure of real networks including email networks have
revealed interesting properties that make these networks fundamentally differ-
ent from random networks. In this section, we present our approach towards
understanding the structure and dynamics of email networks generated from
real email traffic captured on a high-speed Internet backbone link. We also
present the distinguishing characteristics of legitimate and unsolicited email
communications, as well as how these differences can lead to identification of
the antisocial nodes in the network that are sending spam.
1.2.1 Data Collection and Processing
In order to study the characteristics of email traffic, we have collected two large-
scale email datasets by passively capturing traffic on a 10 Gbps backbone link of
SUNET (the Swedish University Network) [1]. Each dataset was collected over
14 consecutive days with roughly a year time span between them. The email
traffic was collected by filtering packets to port 25 in both directions of the link.
The collected packets which belonged to the same flow were aggregated and
the email data was extracted from the flows. Then, each email communication
was classified as either rejected, spam, or ham using a well-trained anti-spam
tool to provide the ground truth for our study. Finally, the email contents were
discarded and the IP addresses and the email addresses were anonymized so
that all the information about the original senders, receivers, and the content of
the emails are lost.
Overall, our email datasets which have the perspective of a network device
monitoring traffic on a high-speed backbone link, provide us with means to
characterize, model, and analyze the social network properties of email and
spam traffic. In this thesis, we present the challenges involved in the collection
and processing of large-scale traffic datasets, particularly the datasets used for
the study of email and spam characteristics.
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1.2.2 Structural and Temporal Analysis
In order to understand the characteristics of unsolicited email traffic and how it
differs from legitimate traffic, we have performed a social network analysis of
the captured email traffic. We have generated email networks from the observed
email communications in which each node represents an email address and each
edge represents an observed email communication between a pair of nodes. It
is important to note that the aim of our study has not been to generate and
model a complete social network of email communications, rather our goal is
to highlight the differences in the social network properties of the legitimate
and unsolicited traffic passing through a backbone link.
Based on our ground truth, we have generated a number of ham, spam,
rejected, and complete email networks, and have studied and compared their
structural and temporal properties. We have looked into the (in-/out-)degree
distribution, average shortest path length, average clustering coefficient, distri-
bution of the size of the connected components, the percentage of total nodes
in the giant connected component, as well as how these properties change over
time as the networks grow. Although the collection duration of 14 consecutive
days is not long enough to study the growth and the evolution of the email net-
works, they still provide us with the possibility to perform a temporal analysis
of the structural properties of the email networks and gain some evidence on
how different properties of these networks change over time. Our study reveals
the similarities and differences in the structural and temporal properties of email
networks of ham and spam, and shows that the antisocial behavior of spam and
rejected traffic are not hidden in the structure of complete email networks.
The analysis has also revealed that the unsolicited traffic causes deviation
from the normal network-level behavior of email traffic. We have shown that
this anomalous behavior can be detected by applying an anomaly detection
method. Since spam is always present in the email traffic, it is needed to de-
ploy an anomaly detection method that can point out the nodes that are the
source of spam. In our study, we have used a distribution-based anomaly de-
tection approach to spot the nodes that cause anomalies in the distributions of
the structural properties of email networks. The anomalies are identified by
comparing the feature distributions (i.e., degree distribution, community size
distribution, and egonet size distribution) of current email traffic against base-
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line distributions generated from previously observed legitimate email traffic in
our datasets.
Overall, we show how the social network analysis of our email datasets
can reveal the differences in the network-level characteristics of spam and ham
traffic, and show that a number of spam sending nodes can be identified based
on their anomalous behavior.
1.2.3 Evaluation of Community Detection Algorithms
Our study of the social network properties of email traffic has also revealed that
email networks exhibit a community structure. Despite the excessive number
of studies on the quality of algorithms for community detection, there is still
no consensus on which algorithm to use for which type of network. Therefore,
we have conducted an empirical study to compare and evaluate a variety of
community detection algorithms based on a set of structural and logical quality
functions on our email networks. Our aim is to find the most suitable approach
that can separate ham and spam emails from the mixture of traffic into distinct
communities by merely analyzing the structure of email networks.
1.3 Contributions
1.3.1 PAPER I
Collection and processing of large-scale datasets can be very challenging. In
this paper, we have described the data collection procedure and the challenges
we have faced when dealing with high-speed data collection on an Internet
backbone link. In particular, we have discussed the process of collecting and
analyzing SMTP traffic in order to study the network-level characteristics of
legitimate and unsolicited email traffic.
1.3.2 PAPER II
Social network analysis of email traffic allows us to understand the differences
in the network-level behavior of legitimate and unsolicited email traffic. In this
paper, we have shown that the collected legitimate email traffic exhibit similar
12
structural properties to other social and interaction networks. Therefore, a ham
network can be modeled as a scale-free small-world network. We have also
shown the similarities and the differences in the structure of spam networks and
how they change over time compared to ham networks and other social net-
works. We have also revealed that the antisocial behavior of spam is not hidden
in a mixture of email traffic and causes anomalies (outliers) in the structure of
email networks.
1.3.3 PAPER III
In this paper we have taken advantage of our observations that unsolicited email
traffic deviate from legitimate email traffic to unveil a number of spam sending
nodes in a network. We have deployed an anomaly detection technique which
computes the divergence between the social network properties of observed
email traffic and the properties of legitimate traffic to identify the communi-
cation patterns that do not conform to the expected normal behavior. We have
used a time-series of email networks generated from traffic collected during
time periods of fixed-length and have used the anomaly detection method to
point out the anomalous nodes in each network. Our experiments have shown
that the length of the period does not affect the performance of the anomaly de-
tection; the percentage of spam sent by the identified anomalous nodes is highly
correlated to the percentage of total spam in the network; and there is a trade-off
in the number of false positives and the percentage of the total spammers that
can be detected by this method.
1.3.4 PAPER IV
In this paper, we have shown that both ham and spam networks, as well as net-
works containing a mixture of both, exhibit a community structure, and that
different community detection algorithms can be used to unfold the communi-
ties of these networks. However there is a trade-off in creating high structural
quality and high logical quality communities. The structural quality of com-
munities can be evaluated using different quality functions such as modularity,
coverage, and conductance, and the logical quality can be evaluated based on
the homogeneity of the edges inside each community. We have revealed that
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although different community detection algorithms use different approaches to
define and extract the communities of a network, algorithms that create commu-
nities with similar granularity and size distribution also achieve similar struc-
tural and logical qualities. We have also shown that the most suitable approach
for achieving high logical quality (i.e., clustering ham and spam emails into dis-
tinct communities) partitions the edges of the network rather than performing
node-based clustering.
1.4 Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis, we present how the social network analysis of email traffic cap-
tured on an Internet backbone link can reveal the differences and similarities in
the network-level characteristics of legitimate and unsolicited email communi-
cations. We show that the different behavior of spam senders causes anomalies
in the structural properties of email networks, and these anomalies can be de-
tected using an anomaly detection approach. We also show that spam and ham,
which are mixed in the observed traffic, can be separated into distinct commu-
nities by deploying a link community detection algorithm.
The proposed approaches in this thesis are promising and can potentially be
used to complement existing anti-spam strategies. The advantage of deploying
our approaches is that it provides us with the possibility of stopping spam closer
to its source by merely using the communication patterns of the email traffic.
However, there is more work to be done before our findings can be deployed
practically as part of an anti-spam tool. Therefore, one desirable future direction
is to investigate how our methods can be combined with each other to be used
as a stand-alone anti-spam system or in corporation with existing tools. One
possibility is to deploy a network device that monitors the traffic on a link and
that is able to stop or tag suspicious traffic. The creation of email networks and
computation of the most of the graph properties can be done quite fast by using
graphics processing units (GPU) instead of CPUs [50]. Another possibility is to
use the output of the traffic analysis to populate dynamic blacklists or whitelists
which are to be consulted by the receiving mail servers as part of their pre-
filtering process. It is known that spammers use fake email addresses, therefore,
other identifiers of the detected spaming nodes such as their IP address should
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be used to blacklist these source of spam.
Moreover, a study of the robustness of our findings in order to see how easy
it is for the spammers to change their sending behavior and how easy it is to
invade detection, is another desirable future direction. It can also be of inter-
est to use machine learning approaches in the process of anomaly detection to
allow automatic adjustment to the dynamic behavior of the network traffic and
improve the detection mechanism. In addition, there are many other anomaly
detection methods that could be explored for the identification of the spamming
nodes in the networks.
Graph-based analysis of backbone traffic by generating networks of IP ad-
dresses has been used previously in order to classify traffic [22, 25] and to iden-
tify P2P botnets [39]. An interesting future direction is to generate IP networks
from the same datasets and study their structural properties and dynamics, as
well as investigating whether the same anomaly detection or community detec-
tion approaches are relevant and can be applied on these type of networks.
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